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Abstract 
Electrical and electronic systems can be disturbed by radiation-induced 
effects. In some cases, radiation-induced effects are of a low probability and 
can be ignored; however, radiation effects must be considered when 
designing systems that have a high mean time to failure requirement, an 
impact on protection, and/or higher exposure to radiation. High-energy 
physics power systems suffer from a combination of these effects: a high 
mean time to failure is required, failure can impact on protection, and the 
proximity of systems to accelerators increases the likelihood of radiation-
induced events. This paper presents the principal radiation-induced effects, 
and radiation environments typical to high-energy physics. It outlines a 
procedure for designing and validating radiation-tolerant systems using 
commercial off-the-shelf components. The paper ends with a worked 
example of radiation-tolerant power converter controls that are being 
developed for the Large Hadron Collider and High Luminosity-Large 
Hadron Collider at CERN.  
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1 Introduction to radiation-induced effects 
Radiation has the potential to interfere with electronic devices and systems, creating so-called 
radiation-induced effects [1]. 
At ground level, atmospheric neutrons due to cosmic rays are a primary source of radiation. 
Cosmic rays are high-energy particles reaching Earth from space. These interact with Earth’s 
atmosphere, producing a shower of particles: neutrons, protons, electrons, and many others, some of 
which reach the Earth’s surface. 
In particle accelerators, the accelerators themselves are sources of radiation. The Large Hadron 
Collider (LHC) at CERN is underground, hence it is somewhat protected against cosmic radiation. In 
this case, the main sources of radiation are the protons in the two circulating LHC beams. These can 
escape from the closed beam orbit, leaving the confines of the accelerator and be lost into local 
materials. There are several mechanisms for beam loss: 
– intentional beam losses occur, due to the collision of beam in LHC experiments; 
– direct beam losses can occur, where beam strikes collimation systems or absorbers; 
– beam gas interactions can occur, where circulating beam hits residual beam gas. 
A single escaping proton has the potential to create a significant shower of particles that 
propagate from the machine into the surrounding area. To understand the effects that this can have, 
one must consider the basic metal oxide semiconductor field effect transistor (MOSFET), which is the 
fundamental basis of electronic systems. An N-channel MOSFET is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1: N-MOS transistor schematic 
Such electronic circuits are at risk from three principal types of radiation-induced effects: total 
ionizing dose (TID), single event effects (SEE) and displacement damage (DD). 
1.1 Total ionizing dose (TID) 
An incident particle can cause direct or indirect ionization of the semiconductor (Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2: Total ionizing dose process 
Figure 2 shows an example of direct ionization, where the primary particle causes ionization: 
(a) a charged particle passes through a semiconductor material; 
(b) the charged particle interacts with the semiconductor; 
(c) electron–hole pairs are generated along the path of the particle due to its energy loss; 
(d) holes that are created remain trapped in the integrated circuit oxides (such as passivation, gate 
oxides, etc.) 
Source DrainGate
P-type
(extra holes)
N-type
(extra electrons)
Gate Oxide 
(high dielectric constant)
Space charge region 
Insulator
(low dielectric constant)
Passivation
(low dielectric constant)
Incident particle
Liberated charges Trapped charge
a b
dc
Indirect ionization occurs when a primary particle causes nuclear reactions that then lead to 
ionization.  
In both cases, the holes created within the oxides cause changes to device characteristics. The 
absorbed dose or total ionizing dose (TID) is a cumulative effect measured in Grays [Gy]. This 
increases over time causing gradual degradation of semiconductor performance. 
This leads to several adverse effects. For example, consider the positive charge collected in the 
gate oxides: N-MOS semiconductors have a decrease in switch-on voltage, as the gate is progressively 
activated by the slow build-up of trapped positive charges. In the same example, P-MOS devices 
exhibit an increase in switch-on voltage, as the positive charges progressively inhibit the switch-on of 
the gate. The first observation of these effects will be changes in timing margins and increases in 
leakage current. Board-level power consumption can increase. Eventually, N-MOS devices will fail so 
that they are permanently activated, and P-MOS devices are permanently de-activated 
All active components are potentially susceptible to TID. 
1.2 Single event effects (SEE) 
A single event effect (SEE) is prompt, having a certain probability (cross-section) of occurring with 
every particle interaction. An SEE manifests in several ways, however the root cause is generally the 
same (Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 3: SEE process (bias not shown, for simplicity) 
Figure 3 considers an incident particle acting on a semiconductor, as described in the TID case. 
However, consider the behaviour of electrons, not holes: 
(a) a charged particle passes through a semiconductor and interacts; 
(b) electrons are generated by the particle as it traverses the material; 
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(c) electrons are highly mobile and flow through the MOSFET, and are collected at the reverse 
biased junction; 
(d) these electrons create a pulse of current shortly after the particle’s interaction. 
In almost all cases, the root cause of the SEE is the current pulse. It can have a variety of 
impacts and outcomes on the circuit. There are two typical soft failures. 
– Single event transient (SET) – a transient is created on a signal path. This has a variety of 
effects depending on the path’s function. One potentially significant impact is an SET on a 
clock line, causing set-up and hold timing to be violated. 
– Single event upset (SEU) – the initial particle interaction causes a stored bit to change in 
value. This erroneous value generally persists until it is re-written. The effect of an SEU on 
the system level depends upon the location and function of the flipped bit. 
Other potentially disastrous failure modes exist, particular in complementary metal oxide 
semiconductor (CMOS) circuitry; consider Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4: CMOS transistor schematic 
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1. A CMOS structure is made from a pair of N-MOS and P-MOS devices; 
2. A basic inverter configuration is shown, with the gates, sources, and drains connected 
appropriately; 
3. A parasitic NPN, PNP structure exists in the CMOS device. 
If a particle interaction deposits sufficient charge, then the parasitic structure can be activated, 
causing hard failures, such as the following. 
– Single event latch-up (SEL) – a low-impedance short-circuit between power supply and 
ground is created; this requires power to be removed for the latch-up to be cleared. An SEL 
has the potential to be catastrophic if it is not mitigated, due to localized heating of the 
component in the high current state [2]. 
– SEE hard failures covers other effects such as single event burnout (SEB) and single event 
gate-rupture (SEGR).  
– SEE are prompt (relative to displacement damage (DD) and TID), and each particle 
traversing the semiconductor has a certain probability of interaction. The particles of interest 
are high energy hadrons (HEH) or ions, and the critical parameter is the cross-section, 
which is the probability of an HEH-induced SEE. 
1.3 Displacement damage (DD) 
Displacement damage (DD) occurs when particles interact with the silicon lattice. Figure 5 shows the 
key process. 
 
Fig. 5: DD process 
In Fig. 5: 
(a) an ideal silicon lattice has regularly spaced atoms; 
(b) incident particles traverse the lattice; 
(c) there is a probability that the particle strikes and dislodges an atom; 
(d) this interaction can create Frenkel defects consisting of a vacancy and an interstitial defect. 
Damage to the lattice is proportional to the integrated flux of particles that have passed through 
the atomic structure, therefore DD gradually increases over time. The effects of DD generally reduce 
device gain, which eventually leads to complete failure of the device. DD mainly affects bipolar 
technologies; CMOS technologies generally do not suffer from DD effects. 
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DD is a cumulative effect and is measured as the total number of 1 MeV equivalent neutrons 
that have passed through a given surface area [1 MeV eq. n/cm2]. The term non-ionizing energy loss 
(NEIL) is also used. 
2 Design for radiation 
Dealing with radiation effects on electronic systems is a fundamental part of electronics design; at the 
same time, it is a tremendously complex and expensive requirement. Engineers should make every 
effort to first optimize the system requirements before embarking on the development of radiation-
tolerant designs. Only after exhausting all alternatives should the design of a radiation-exposed system 
be undertaken. The main considerations to address are given below. 
– Functional – is the system needed at all? Engineers should consider whether it is possible to 
design-out the system’s function at a higher level. Are there alternative means to achieve the 
same goal without having a dedicated system? What are the consequences of not having this 
system? 
– Environmental – does the system need to be here? Before undertaking a system design, 
exhaust all options for moving systems away from radiation, or shielding equipment from 
radiation. Move every element that can be moved, in order to minimize the amount of 
radiation-exposed elements as possible. 
– Dependability – can the permitted failure rate of the system be increased? Dependability 
requirements should be established at an early phase. The system should have a reasonable 
failure rate. In addition, the permitted failure modes should be outlined. Protection-related 
systems may have a strict unsafe failure rate specification. Systems with such a requirement 
add further complexity to an already complex process. Engineers should make every effort 
to increase the permitted failure rate, and to exclude undesired failure modes. 
2.1 Radiation hardened vs. radiation tolerant 
Once it is decided that a radiation-exposed system must be designed, a primary factor is to determine 
whether a radiation-hardened or radiation-tolerant design is needed. 
The principal consideration is the environment. Figure 6 shows typical values of radiation 
fluence and dose for sea, air, and space applications, as well as the approaches needed. The 
delimitation of the areas is not a fixed value, and can be debated. 
 
Fig. 6: Radiation exposure levels vs. engineering approach (CERN defined) 
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Radiation-hardened systems (as defined at CERN) exhibit no adverse effects from radiation, as 
they are immune to radiation-induced problems, in the environment specified, up to defined limits. 
These systems can make use of radiation-hardened technologies (so-called radiation-hardening-by-
process) or mitigation of radiation effects at the design level (radiation-hardening-by-design). A 
complete, certified, radiation-hardened hardware solution can be designed. One of the key drawbacks 
of this approach is cost.  For example, a radiation-hardened programmable logic device is 100–1000 
times more expensive than a commercial device [3], and a custom-made integrated circuit can have 
extremely high set-up costs in the order of millions of Swiss Francs [4]. 
Radiation-tolerant systems (as defined at CERN) are those that can be made to function in 
radiation environments despite being susceptible to radiation. This is primarily done by mitigating the 
consequences of the effects. This paper explains the process of designing radiation-tolerant systems 
based on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. 
2.2 Radiation-tolerant design flow 
A design flow has been created to address project risks specific to the development of radiation-
tolerant COTS electronics. The design flow begins after the requirements capture and engineering 
specification phases. The process flows of electronics system and radiation-tolerant system 
development are shown in Fig. 7.  
 
Fig. 7: Electronics design flow and radiation tolerance electronics design flow [5, 6] 
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The arrows in Fig. 7 show the impact of an electronic component that is not satisfactory. The 
arrows are marked C0, C1 and C2 as a function of criticality of the unsatisfactory component in the 
design flow. A complete classification of components, their criticalities and different steps are 
described in the following paragraphs of this section. This flow can be directly compared with the 
Radiation Hardness Assurance of components ECSS-Q-ST-60-15C [7]. 
– Conceptual design – a basic design for the system is selected, with solutions proposed for 
the implementation of each required function from the engineering specification. 
– Component selection – the conceptual design is broken into sub-systems, and a component 
inventory is established, with components organized by functional requirements. The 
component selection and creation of the bill-of-materials (BoM) are made in close 
collaboration with the design team. The defined functionality of the system needs to be 
balanced against the feasible radiation-tolerant solutions. This is an iterative process, which 
continues as radiation tests advance. Some components may need to be changed as results 
appear from testing. Radiation testing is a slow and complex process, thus minimization of 
component count and variation is a key requirement. 
– Radiation risk classification – each component to be used is classified into one of three risk 
classes (C0–2) based on a risk matrix, cross-referencing the likelihood and impact of 
radiation-induced failure. Three main criteria are used for the component classification: 
1. the known susceptibility of the type of component to radiation; 
2. the function of this component in the design, i.e. the impact of its failure on system 
reliability; 
3. the availability of alternatives for the component. 
A summary is given below. 
– C0 components are those that are known to be resistant to radiation, or are easily 
replaced if found to be weak. In general the design of the system is not influenced by 
these C0 parts. Examples: resistors, capacitors, diodes, transistors, etc. 
– C1 components are those that are potentially susceptible to radiation, in less critical parts 
of the system. Substitution of parts or mitigation of issues is possible with a redesign. 
Examples: regulators, references, drivers, level translators, memory, etc. 
– C2 components are those that are potentially susceptible to radiation, being found in 
more critical parts of the system. If these parts do not perform well then the basic design 
is compromised, and a significant rework of the conceptual design is needed. 
Substitution of parts or mitigation of issues due to C2 parts is generally difficult. 
Examples: analog-to-digital converters (ADCs), programmable logic, mixed circuits, 
etc. 
– Type testing – the selected components are subject to radiation testing to identify cross-
sections and to predict component lifetimes. Various sources of radiation test data can 
be consulted from other institutes and organizations such as the ESA [8], NASA [9, 10] 
or in the IEEE NSREC data workshop proceedings. In some cases, test setup, test 
procedure and test parameters such as bias conditions or temperature may be similar to 
the project application and the test results can be directly used without a dedicated 
radiation characterization test. It should be noted that some of the ESA/NASA tests are 
performed on high-reliability electronic components, which can have different radiation 
tolerance to regular COTS components, even when considering the same reference 
numbers from the same manufacturer.  
In the absence of reliable radiation results for a given component, a radiation campaign is 
prepared. Each individual component is tested by applying procedures that are briefly described in 
Ref. [11]. The higher the class of the component, the more detailed is the analysis of its response to 
radiation.  
Several reference test standards exist for the planning and execution of the radiation tests. These 
are: for SEE, JEDEC Test Standard 57 [12] or ESA/SCC 25100 [13]; for TID, MIL-STD 1019.8 [14], 
ASTM F1892 [15] or ESA/SCC 22900 [16]. An extensive review of TID radiation hardness assurance 
standards can be found in Ref. [17]. The level of testing required depends upon the class of the 
component (Table 1). 
Table 1: Radiation characterization test methodology 
Class Mixed field Proton Heavy ion 
C0 Mandatory   
C1 Optional Mandatory  
C2 Optional Mandatory Mandatory 
At CERN, C0 components are tested in a mixed-field radiation environment equivalent to LHC 
tunnel conditions, thus giving a direct indication of the device’s performance in the final application. 
C1 components are irradiated with mono-energetic protons to measure susceptibility to SEE and 
TID; mixed-field tests are optional proton tests that allow assessment of SEE and TID response of a 
component in a much shorter time. Two or more candidate parts for each C1 position should pass type 
testing. If this cannot be ensured, it is possible that a return to component selection is needed to find 
more candidate parts.  
Type-testing failure of C2 parts is critical for the project. These are tested in exactly the same 
way as the C1 components, with the addition of heavy-ion testing to assess SEL cross-section and the 
respective risk in the LHC radiation environment. At least one C2 part must be found that meets 
system requirements. If this is not the case the conceptual design must be revised. 
– Detailed design – the remainder of the design is established, using components that 
performed well in type testing. 
– Dependability analysis – the reliability of the system hardware is predicted, using cross-
sections, lifetimes and electrical characteristics. Traditional reliability engineering 
techniques can be used to meet system requirements. 
– Prototype testing – a small number of prototypes are constructed, following the concept 
emerging from the dependability analysis. These are used to validate design choices, and to 
ensure correct integration between connecting systems and controls. 
– Final design – the final design is established, which on paper meets all of the functional and 
dependability requirements of the system. 
– Component batch testing – after prototype validation and definition of the final 
implementation, the procurement of large quantities of components begins. Each has to be 
qualified to confirm the results of the type testing and to assure the conformity of the 
component radiation response within the lot. COTS components form the main part of those 
used in this framework; ideally all production components should be procured from a single 
fabrication lot to decrease the component-to-component variability. In many cases, it is 
impossible to get such information concerning the number of silicon wafers from which the 
components were made, their lot date code, or even the lot origin. This makes lot acceptance 
tests complex and challenging. ESA specifications require a minimum of 11 samples to be 
selected for TID characterization: ten for irradiation and one reference part. Similarly, the 
CERN lot acceptance test strategy requires a minimum of ten irradiated samples and one 
reference for each component lot. The number of samples to be tested for SEE 
characterization is much smaller, typically three [13].  
If a C0 component does not pass testing, another equivalent component will be purchased 
and lot acceptance tests will be performed. If a C1 component does not pass the lot 
acceptance tests, its equivalent will be chosen from a list of preferred replacements for C1 
components prepared in advance during preparation of the BoM. As shown in Fig. 2, C2 
components are highly critical for the design, and in the case of lot non-conformity the 
project’s conceptual design will have to be revised. For all C2 components it is of the utmost 
priority to decrease the probability of lot problems. 
– Industrialization and fabrication – the number of required units is produced, after 
industrialization, ensuring the best quality is achieved for the product being designed.  
– Pre-series testing – production is usually split into pre-series and series production. A small 
number of parts are delivered first, which are manufactured using the industrial assembly 
line. Accelerated lifetime testing and dedicated irradiation testing can be carried out to 
ensure that industrialized fabrication yields parts that meet predictions. 
– Burn-in → surveillance – the usual steps in the delivery of an engineering product. 
3 Radiation testing 
Radiation testing is a crucial aspect of the development of radiation-tolerant electronic systems. The 
three key radiation effects need to be characterized and quantified for each of the parts being used.  
To determine the effects of displacement damage, parts are placed in the vicinity of radiation 
sources, typically neutrons. The parts do not need to be powered for displacement damage to occur; 
after irradiation parts are characterized on electrical test benches. Dedicated irradiation areas can be 
found in the proximity to fission reactors, such as PROSPERO [18]. 
SEE cross-sections and TID limits are determined by controlled exposure to radiation. This is 
done by building dedicated test equipment that exercises components whilst they are being irradiated. 
Tests and observations are carried out, looking for the malfunction characteristics of SEEs, and the 
end-of-life due to TID. Special care has to be taken to subject parts to a representative radiation field. 
The irradiation spectra have to give meaningful results considering the environment in which the 
system is to be used.  
An example of a representative SEE and TID test area was the CERN Neutrinos to Gran Sasso 
(CNGS) gallery, which was operated until 2012. Proton beams from the Super Proton Synchrotron 
(SPS) were extracted onto a target, creating a neutrino beam. A radiation field is created by the 
interaction of the proton beam with the target, so components could be tested in the immediate vicinity 
(Fig. 8). 
 
Fig. 8: Plan view of the CNGS installation [19] 
A typical test apparatus placed in this location includes devices under test, which are surveyed 
and characterized. The conclusions from such tests are the device failure modes, and failure mode 
ratios. This is an exhaustive list of errors that have been observed, grouped by failure mode. The ratios 
of each type of error are also determined. In addition the TID limit is determined, giving the effective 
device lifetime in this particular radiation field. A drawback of these tests is limited beam availability 
and long irradiation time due to the low fluences that can be obtained [18]. At CERN a new facility, 
called CHARM, is under construction to overcome these limitations [20, 21]. CHARM is intended to 
provide: 
• mixed-field particle spectra representative of the LHC tunnel, space, and/or ground level; 
• a large testing volume to allow the testing of several cubic metres of equipment; 
• high beam availability and intensity higher than an operational environment as in the LHC 
tunnel. 
4 Applying the design flow to power converter controls 
The design flow outlined in the previous section is being applied to the development of the power 
converter controls for the LHC at CERN. The LHC has several thousand normal and superconducting 
magnets with associated power converters. A typical example circuit is the 13 kA dipole circuit as 
shown in Fig. 9. 
 
Fig. 9: Superconducting electrical circuit, with power converter 
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These circuits have a high stored energy, and use a system of interlocks and protection to guard 
against the uncontrolled release of magnet and powering energy. The power converter converts mains 
energy to the required magnetic field for beam operations (Table 2). The set point and operation of the 
power converter is managed by a power converter controller. 
Table 2: Types of power converter in the LHC 
Principal application 
[magnet] 
Voltage 
[V] 
Current 
[A] 
Quantity 
Main dipoles 13 000 190 8 
Main quadrupoles 13 000 18 16 
Quadrupole circuits 4 000–6 000–8 000 8 188 
Warm circuits 1 000 450–950 16 
Sextupole circuits 600 40 37 
Octupole circuits 600 10 400 
Orbit correctors 120 10 298 
Orbit correctors 60 8 752 
This gives a total of over 1700 power converters used in the LHC. These are located in one of 
five different areas (Fig. 10), each with a different risk classification for radiation: 
1. at the surface; 
2. in parallel galleries; 
3. in perpendicular galleries; 
4. in alcoves; 
5. the LHC accelerator tunnel. 
  
Fig. 10: Civil works with principal converter locations [22] 
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Perpendicular galleries, alcoves, and the accelerator tunnel each present a moderate to high 
level of risk concerning exposure to radiation. Of the power converter quantities shown before, over 
1000 are located in such areas (Table 3). 
Table 3: Power converters found in moderate to high radiation risk areas [23] 
Principal application 
[magnet] 
Voltage 
[V] 
Current 
[A] 
Perpendicular Alcove Tunnel 
Quadrupole circuits 4000–6000–8000 8 6 60 - 
Sextupole circuits 600 40 - 12 - 
Octupole circuits 600 10 24 104 - 
Orbit correctors 120 10 15 92 - 
Orbit correctors 60 8 - - 752 
Each power converter can be broken down into three distinct sections (Fig. 11). 
1. a function generator controller (FGC) electronic module; 
2. a voltage source (VS), consisting of power electronics and power circuits converting mains 
power to the current and voltage requested by the FGC; 
3. current transformers (DCCT) converting the electrical output current of the converter into a 
digital value that is read back by the FGC. 
 
Fig. 11: Key components of a power converter 
The design flow has been applied to the design and realization of the FGC that is to be used in 
the power converters located in moderate to high radiation risk areas, as shown in Table 3. 
4.1 Function generator controller 
The FGC is a purpose-built electronic module having several functions (Fig. 12). Most notably [24] it: 
– implements closed-loop regulation of the magnet current, reading the measured current Imeas 
to establish the reference voltage Vref needed for the field; 
– controls the converter, by issuing digital commands such as ON, OFF, and RESET; 
– implements low-level interlock logic as part of the interlock loops between the VS, quench 
detection, and powering interlock systems [25]; 
– allows remote control and surveillance of the converter and associated subsystems. 
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Fig. 12: Basic connectivity of an FGC 
The control system of the LHC power converter controls is based on the WorldFIP fieldbus 
(Fig. 13), using a gateway computer with bus master to send and receive real-time commands to FGC 
slaves. 
 
Fig. 13: Fieldbus control principle 
The use of the fieldbus provides a low-bandwidth communications solution for the FGC. During 
each cycle only around 32 bytes can be transmitted to, and 128 bytes received from, each FGC [26]. 
4.2 Radiation-tolerant function generator controller 
From the operational point of view, power converters are to behave in the same way regardless of 
whether an FGC or an FGClite controller is used. To optimize costs, the existing fieldbus 
infrastructure will be re-used and FGClites will be plug-compatible with FGC2. This makes 
significant savings but means that fundamental changes to the FGC philosophy are not possible. Effort 
has been put into the optimization of software, programmable logic, and hardware partitions to 
minimize the complexity of the FGClites, whilst meeting system-level requirements. 
In FGC2, the current reference as a function of time is stored locally in each FGC. A function 
table and regulation circuit use circuit settings specific to the magnet circuit being powered to drive 
the voltage reference point (Fig. 14). 
 
Fig. 14: Closed loop control architecture changes [26] 
The gateway sends simple commands such as start regulation to each FGC. The most 
significant hardware change for the FGClites is the relocation of the digital signal processor (DSP) 
into the gateway, with the FGClite acting as a remote input/output module. 
The gateway complexity is significantly increased as it is required to implement the regulation 
calculations for all FGClites connected on the same fieldbus segment. This increases the latency of the 
regulation loop due to the transmission of information back and forth on the fieldbus, which requires 
the regulation algorithms to be adjusted. Additionally, FGC2 was capable of working independently of 
the fieldbus for short periods, whereas the FGClites will be completely dependent on the fieldbus for 
correct operation. 
4.3 Software and programmable logic partitioning 
FGC2 depends on both software and programmable logic to achieve its functional requirements. 
Embedded software is used both for closed-loop signal processing and converter supervision. In the 
FGC2, eleven programmable logic devices are used for sub-functions such as timer circuits, access to 
coefficients, and digital multiplexing, amongst others (Fig. 15). 
 
Fig. 15: Architecture changes  
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FGClites are to have no locally executed software as the signal processing functions are to be 
moved to the gateway. The remaining supervision requirements, as well as FGC2 functions 
implemented in programmable logic, are to be implemented in three flash-based field programmable 
gate arrays (FPGAs) having functionality described in VHSIC hardware description language 
(VHDL). 
The obsolete WorldFIP chipset is also to be replaced by CERN nanoFIP, which also uses a flash 
FPGA. NanoFIP exploits the WorldFIP electrical standard but a simple transmission protocol between 
gateway and power converter [27]. 
4.4 Predicted reliability and lifetime 
Failures of the power converter hardware can be split into two categories: basic failures corresponding 
to the bathtub curve and those related to radiation damage. 
4.5 Basic failures 
The first source of failure is expected to follow the typical hazard function for the failure of non-
complex electronic systems, the so-called bathtub curve, made up of three sections. 
– Early-life failures are caused by latent defects and are avoided by processes such as stress 
screening and running-in. 
The useful-life failure rate is one of the biggest concerns for the success of the FGClite 
project in meeting its reliability goal. Failures of this nature can occur at any moment in 
time and are not correlated. This is to be minimized by following design practices promoting 
reliability, such as over-specification and redundancy. The base failure rate of the FGClites 
will be determined using a combination of past experience and military handbooks. 
– Wear-out failures are due to the gradual wear-and-tear of electronic systems in use. In the 
FGClites these are to be minimized by following the most appropriate maintenance plan, 
either preventive or reliability centred maintenance (RCM).  
4.6 Radiation-induced failures 
The second source of failure is that related to radiation. Radiation-induced damage manifests itself in 
two manners: cumulative and prompt. Cumulative or total dose effects reduce the effective system 
lifetime by advancing the wear-out phase, and SEEs increase the random-in-time failure rate of the 
system across its whole lifetime. 
First prompt effects, such as SEU or SEL, can cause the system to malfunction, having the 
effect of increasing the random-in-time failure rate of the FGClites. The predicted number of failures 
per year can be seen as a function of the fluence of particles in the areas in which the FGC is installed, 
and the cross-section of each FGClite. Figure 16 shows the characteristics for a subset of converters 
with an LS1–LS2 estimated fluence of 9 × 109 high energy hadrons (HEH) per square centimetre per 
year in tunnel installations [28]. 
 
Fig. 16: Cross-section and predicted failure rate for LHC operational phases 
4.7 Requirements 
There are two key requirements: lifetime, and reliability. 
– Lifetime: the FGClites must be designed to outlast the LHC. Current planning extends into 
the 2030s, so an FGClite installed in 2015 would need >25 years’ lifetime. In addition to the 
electrical requirement, radiation dictates that every component in the FGClites must remain 
within specification after absorbing around 200 Gy. 
– Reliability: power converters have a direct influence on the availability of the LHC 
machine. the LHC is expected to run for 200 days every year, with two ten-hour fills, and 
two recovery periods of two hours every day [29]. This gives 400 LHC missions per year. 
No more than 10% of these should be aborted due to the failure of power converters; this 
means that each power converter must have an MTBF in excess of 400 000 hours. 
This can be split between electrical and radiation-induced failures. Electrical MTBF is therefore 
required to be similar to the existing controllers, with a maximum of 10 radiation-induced failures per 
year of operation for all installed systems. This means the SEE cross-section of the FGClites is 
required to be equal to 3 × 10−12 cm2 or lower. 
Combining these requirements means that all FGClites in operation are expected to fail less than 
10 times per year due to radiation-induced errors, and less than 30 times due to electrical effects, 
meeting the combined requirement of less than 40 failures per year. 
4.8 FGClite project risks 
FGClites are required to be installed in the LHC at the end of 2015. The most significant risk to the 
successful completion of the project concerns class C2 components: optimization of component 
selection has yielded only three C2 parts: 
– the ADC used to determine Imeas; 
– the mixed analog–digital IC used for the fieldbus interface; 
– the flash-FPGA used throughout the design. 
Early efforts focused on the type testing and component batch testing of these parts to determine 
their suitability for the FGClites. 
The quality of statistics is critical for reliability calculations, as they drive both the mitigation 
techniques and overall FGClite reliability. Of particular importance is the predicted HEH fluence in 
the LHC tunnel. In this context there is a risk of over-engineering the FGClites by taking an 
excessively pessimistic view: layers of redundancy and power-cycling options could be in excess of 
the project needs, reducing overall reliability.  
The shift away from software towards programmable logic has many implications, ranging from 
the skills required from the project team, to quality assurance of the FGClites. Reliability calculations 
explained in this paper assume a non-complex system, free from systematic faults. The programmable 
logic engineering must be of the highest quality, matching that used elsewhere at CERN, following 
guidelines for dependable VHDL design that have been developed in the course of other systems’ 
developments at CERN [26]. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has explained the principal effects of radiation on electronic components, and has described 
the principal steps needed to design a radiation-tolerant system. The paper included a worked example 
showing how radiation-tolerant power converter controls are being developed. 
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